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systems of corporate governance. The attached paper has been prepared by him as 
fulfillment of requirements for the course. 
I have awarded Ken a grade of Excellent based on his diligent study of the institution of 
the Board of Directors in corporations. In the paper he has submitted, Ken first provides 
an overview of the state of Boards in the United States. In this, he has done a reasonable 
job in summarizing reports from a variety of places. This summary provides a good 
starting point for his discussions later in the paper. 
Ken goes on to examine various duties that Boards are supposed to discharge under a 
variety of circumstances, especially in the context of the American corporate governance 
system. In this section, he does a very good job of collecting together various arguments 
and presenting them clearly. He also looks at the evolution of these duties in light of 
recent court judgements. 
Ken goes on to comment on the state of Boards in the German and Japanese systems. 
While his discussion of the German system is not quite comprehensive, his relative 
familiarity with Japanese corporate governance system allows him to examine differences 
with the US system with a reasonably critical eye. 
Finally, Ken presents an analysis of what Boards should do and what factors should 
determine their size, composition and extent of duties. Here he presents contrasting 
arguments well, keeping in mind that these are both topical and hotly debated issues. 
While he cannot be expected to generate truly original findings in an area where research 
on the fundamental issues is still an ongoing endeavor, he does manage to bring out the 
essential points of the debates quite well. 
All in all, Ken has demonstrated the signs of concentrated and effective learning in an 
area where the debate is concerned with a multitude of viewpoints and paradigms. He has 
also shown an impressive amount of maturity in being able to understand and classify the 
issues well. While the submitted paper could very well be better exposited in places, I 
think that, overall, it shows evidence of substantial work at both understanding and 
presenting issues of critical importance in today's business world. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The board of directors is the single most important corporate governance 
mechanism, in principle. At least in the U.S., directors have the legal authority to perform 
almost every function in governing corporations. However, the boards have historically 
lacked the appropriate incentives and the procedural mechanisms to elicit the most 
effective oversight. Accordingly, much of the corporate governance debate revolves 
around questions about whose interest boards of directors should serve, what they should 
do, and how they can be best organized to ensure that they carry out their duties.1 The 
goal of this paper is to provide necessary considerations to the above three questions. 
In the first section of this paper, the reality of the American boards of directors is 
described, mainly through summarizing surveys of institutional arrangements. The second 
section deals with the underlying problem in governing modern corporations, and 
approaches in the U.S., Japan, and Germany are compared. The third to fifth sections 
deals with the three questions respectively. In considering whose interest boards should 
serve, shareholders-value principle is revisited and how boards should treat other 
constituencies are tested, from a view of societies' expectation. In considering what 
boards should do, the implication of the U.S. corporate law is examined, and boards' 
appropriate behaviors in both ordinary course of business and extraordinary case of 
takeover threat are provided. In considering how boards should be best organized, each 
element of institutional arrangements is tested in accordance with the expected functions 
of boards. 
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REALITY OF THE AMERICAN BOARDS 
What Boards Are Doing 
History in brief. A board is the only formal organization directly chosen by 
shareholders, and therefore is responsible for managing the affairs of the corporations. To 
complete this responsibility, for decades the American boards have delegated to managers 
the daily running of the business, given managers the authority to make business decision, 
and monitored the performance of the delegated management. 
The role of the boards had disappeared in mid-twentieth century, after the 
separation of corporate ownership from corporate control became virtually complete and 
professional managers started dominating corporate decision-making. Boards became 
often cited as "rubber-stamps" for management, with a merely ceremonial function.2 
However, particularly after late 80's, the rules for corporate boards have been 
changed. Major drivers include the takeover wave of 80's, the greater scrutiny by both the 
judiciary and the business press, and activism by the institutional investors that own an 
ever increasing share of corporate equity.3 Responding to such pressures, the General 
Motors set the example of well-functioning boards that address the separation of equity 
ownership from control. In 1994, the GM issued its Board of Directors Corporate 
Governance Guidelines, which were widely circulated. The California Public Employees' 
Retirement System (CalPERS), a typical institutional activist, wrote to the board chairs of 
1 Blair Ownership and Control 1995, pp77-78 
2 Millstein and MacAvoy The Active Board of Directors and Improved Performance of the Large Publicly-traded 
Corporation 1997. pl2 
2 
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the 300 largest public companies requesting the comparison between the GM guidelines 
and their own practices, and graded the level of boards' self-developments.4 
Nowadays, the boards of directors are expected to assume a more engaged role 
and a greater degree of accountability. Boards' mandate remains unchanged: not running 
the company, but hiring, monitoring, compensating, and if necessary firing management.5 
It is required for boards to oversee management in a proactive and professional manner. 
Legal responsibilities. Having a board of directors, with fiduciary responsibilities 
for the corporation, is required in state corporate laws. A fiduciary is someone who has 
legal responsibility to care for something held in trust for someone else. Fiduciary duties 
impose the duties of loyalty and care. The duty of loyalty prohibits self-dealing 
transactions at the expense of the corporation and requires to avoid conflicts of interest. 
The duty of care requires each director to act in good faith, with the care an ordinarily 
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances, and in a 
manner he/she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. The 
application of these duties is complicated, because corporations are not merely simple 
trusts. Interests of various constituencies are involved, and the goals of corporations are 
not clearly defined.6 Thus, judgements on what directors should do or should not do to 
fulfill their fiduciary duties depend on the courts' decisions in individual law suites. 
However, in practice, so-called business judgement rule keeps the courts out of 
the affairs of companies. Formally, the business judgement rule is the common law 
3 D a v i s "Corporate Boards in Times of Turbulent Change" 1998, p278 
4 NACD Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Director Professionalism 1996, ppl-2 
5 Davis "Corporate Boards in Times of Turbulent Change" 1998, p286 
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return on their investment".' 
A current stock price is considered to measure the company's fair market value, 
and its movement serves as the scorecard of corporate performance.10 Financial theories 
suggest that a stock price be quoted as the present value of expected dividends in the 
future.11 Another way to put it is that the net present value of all free cash flows in the 
future should be equal to the corporation's market value, and that by dividing by the 
number of outstanding shares after subtraction of its debt value, the market price should be 
determined.12 Therefore, instead of holding stocks throughout the company's life, 
shareholders can realize the value created by the company through the sale of stock at 
market. 
Capital markets are assumed, and further encouraged, to allocate capital among 
firms efficiently. A stock price under well-functioning capital markets not only measures 
how the company is doing business, but also how it is governed in line with shareholders' 
interest. According to a survey by McKinsey in 1996, two-thirds of American investors 
are willing to pay more, on average 16 percent more, for the company with the properly 
structured and functioning board of directors, all other things being equal.13 
Ordinary course of business. Again, the main role boards are playing is to 
oversee management. According to the Korn/Ferry survey, board meetings were held 
in 1993, excluding sub-committee meetings. Banks and other 
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financial institutions met most frequently with an average of nine meetings, while 
insurance companies met least often with six meetings.14 Issues to be discussed at board 
meetings can be determined by each company in either its bylaws or other guidelines, in 
addition to those issues obligated by corporate laws. Boards are commonly supposed to 
discuss a corporate philosophy and mission, to review and approve management's 
strategic and business plans, and reviewing corporate performance against the plans.15 In 
addition, governing documents of corporations often require boards to authorize major 
transactions, declare dividends, and authorize the sale of additional securities in 
accordance with their articles of incorporation.1 
Boards are also playing a role in selecting, evaluating, compensating, and if 
necessary replacing the CEO and other senior executives. Interviews with outside 
directors revealed that these traditional functions staked out for the board are still the 
greatest source of directors' influence.17 In the selection process of management 
succession, 67 percent of boards determines whether to consider external candidates, 63 
percent defines qualifications and performance expectations for next CEO, 46 percent 
identifies potential CEO candidates, 65 percent meets and evaluates CEO candidates, and 
64 percent selects CEO successor.18 In evaluation and compensation, 78 percent of 
surveyed corporations have a formal process of evaluating the performance of the CEO, 
either once or twice a year, and CEO compensation is based on the evaluation received in 
Graduate Independent Research Project (FIN750-021) 
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94 percent of the cases. Other key executives also receive boards' evaluation in 43 
percent of overall surveyed companies, and in 58 percent of 5 billion-and-over 
industrials. 
Takeovers. In the U.S., there have been four takeover waves in the 20* century, 
and the most recent wave was in 80s. At least 143 out of the 500 largest industrial 
corporations in 1980 had been acquired during the decade. Although the majority was 
friendly takeovers, which were carried out with the consent of target firms, there were also 
a substantial number of hostile takeovers, in which the management of target firms fought 
against bids.20 
Takeovers are an extraordinary situation with fundamental change of the 
company's business, and therefore, give different stories to the role of the boards of 
directors from the ordinary course of business. In friendly mergers, management 
proposals have to be submitted to shareholder votes, and boards as "gate-keepers" are 
required to approve the proposed transactions prior to submission to shareholders.21 In 
hostile takeovers, most defensive tactics are permitted without shareholders approval, but 
duties of care and loyalty of boards have been tested at the courts. While the business 
judgement rule strongly protects boards in the ordinary course of business, board's 
performance has been challenged in case of such extraordinary cases as takeovers. 
The Roles of the Board of Directors under Corporate Governance Systems 
How Boards Are Organized 
Composition. While the corporate laws in the U.S. allow each company to 
choose the method of organization, it is quite often the case that shareholders' meeting 
elects directors by simple majority. Shareholders also often retain the right to remove a 
director at annual meetings, with or without cause depending on the articles of 
incorporation, by a simple majority.22 In reality, however, it is extremely hard for 
shareholders to remove a director and to nominate a new director. Usually, the boards of 
directors, occasionally with strong influence from management, nominate the candidates 
for new directors, and all shareholders can do is to vote or to choose not to vote.23 
According to the Korn/Ferry's survey in 1994, the nominating committee has the basic 
responsibility for selection of outside directors in 63 percent of surveyed 348 corporations, 
followed by the CEO with 34 percent. Directors are mainly located through 
recommendations of other board members (86 percent), recommendations of the chairman 
(85 percent), and nominating committee within the boards (70 percent). Use of the 
nominating committee is particularly popular at the largest industrials, 95 percent of $5 
billion-and-over-revenue companies. Dependence on the recommendations of 
institutional investors is only eight percent, though it shows increasing trend.24 
In the vast majority of the American corporations, one person concurrently serves 
as the chairman of the board and the CEO. It is worthwhile to note that more than 80 
percent boards in the U.K. contrarily have a full-time non-executive chairman, while 
22 F u k a o Financial I and the Performance of Multinational Companies 1995, p98 
23 Blair Ownership and Control 1995, p79 
24 Korn/Ferry International Twenty-first Annual Board of Directors Study 1994, pi 1 
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corporate governance systems in the U.S. and the U.K. demonstrate much similarity and 
often collectively referred as the Anglo-American system. In the U.S., 80 percent of 
respondents to the Korn/Ferry survey do not separate the positions of the chairman and 
CEO.26 24 percent of corporations had a lead director role, as a non-management board 
leadership position, in 1996. 
Board members other than the chairman are either part of the management team 
or drawn from the outside of the firm. The proportion of outside directors is around 75 
percent in average, and slightly varies by the industry and size of the firm. For example in 
1993, 80 percent is outside directors in banks and other financial institutions, and the 
largest consumer product companies have 64 percent outsiders. Outside directors are most 
commonly drawn from the rank of CEOs, COOs, and retired executives of other 
companies. More than 85 percent of boards include CEOs or COOs of other firms, and 
each has four of them on average.28 Other pools for non-executive directors are 
academicians (58.2 percent of surveyed boards include at least one.), attorneys (56.8 
percent), retired officers of the firm (48.7 percent), investment and commercial bankers 
(36.2 percent), former government officials (31.0 percent), and major shareholders (26.1 
percent).29 
Candidates occasionally decline invitations to serve on boards, and 65 percent of 
the surveyed firms experienced such decline in 1993. CEOs at billion dollar companies 
25 Davis "Corporate Boards in Times of Turbulent Change" 1998, p284 
26 Korn/Ferry International Twenty-first Annual Board of Directors Study 1994, p7 
27 Millstein and MacAvoy The Active Board of Directors and Improved Performance of the Large Publicly-traded 
Corporation 1997. pp7-8 
28 Korn/Ferry International Twenty-first Annual Board of Directors Study 1994, p7 
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and service firms average three board memberships in addition to their own, and the 
proportion of those CEOs who declined invitations to boards reached 76 percent in 1993. 
The main reason to decline invitation is considered time commitment, as 90 percent of 
surveyed CEOs responded so.30 Time required to spend on board-related business 
demonstrated significant increase, to 141 hours for insiders and 157 hours for outsiders on 
average in 1996. 
Sub-committees. Publicly traded companies are increasingly forming sub-
committees. One reason is the requirements from outside, such as stock exchanges and 
tax rulings. Companies listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ are required to have, and those 
on the ASE are recommended to have, an audit committee comprised of independent 
directors. It is also becoming popular that boards have independent sub-committee 
responsible for evaluation and compensation of CEOs, because tax ruling encourage this. 
Corporate tax deduction for executive compensation package is denied for the portion 
exceeding $ 1 million a year, unless those packages tie compensation tightly to 
performance and meet certain other requirements. One of these stipulates that the 
compensation package be determined by a compensation committee composed entirely of 
outside directors.32 Moreover, certain proxy rules and regulation mandate disclosure of 
certain committee structures and functions, which may encourage the appointment of 
board nominating and compensation committee. In addition to audit, nominating, and 
compensations, a few companies have voluntarily formed special social responsibility, 
29 Korn/Ferry International Twenty-first Annual Board of Directors Study 1994, pl3 
30 Korn/Ferry International Twenty-first Annual Board of Directors Study 1994, ppll-12, 19 
31 Millstein and MacAvoy The Active Board of Directors and Improved Performance of the Large Publicly-traded 
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environmental, corporate ethics, or corporate governance committees/ 
According to the Korn/Ferry survey in 1993, 99.7 percent of surveyed boards had 
audit committees. 96.6 percent had compensation committees and 67.3 percent had 
nominating committees. Other surveyed sub-committees included executive (74.9 
percent), finance (37.0 percent), public affairs (15.6 percent), corporate ethics (6.7 
percent), and science/technology (3.7 percent). Most sub-committees demonstrated 
increasing trend, and the increase in nominating committee was most significant. The 
Investor Responsibility Research Center reported that 40.2 percent of large companies 
have completely independent nominating committees as of 1996. 
In case of the GM as of 1995 revision of the guideline, there were six 
committees: Audit, Capital Stock, Director Affairs, Finance, Executive Compensation, 
and Public Policy. With the exception of the Finance Committee, all committees consisted 
of independent directors. Although not mandated, periodic rotations of committee 
members at about a five-year interval are encouraged. 
Size and term. The size of the boards of U.S. companies is reducing. An average 
board had 14 members in 1987 but only 12 in 1992.37 As reasonably expected, the size 
varies with both company size and type of business. In 1993, banks and other financial 
institutions had the largest boards with average 15 directors, and under-$400million small 
Corporation 1997. p5 
32 Blair Ownership and Control 1995, p58 
33 Blair Ownership and Control 1995, p82 
34 Korn/Ferry Internationa] Twenty-first Annual Board of Directors Study 1994, pl4 
35 Millstein and MacAvoy The Active Board of Directors and Improved Performance of the Large Publicly-traded 
Corporation 1997, p6 
36 NACD Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Director Professionalism 1996, p30 
37 Blair Ownership and Control 1995, p82 
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industrials had average 9 directors. For example, the 1995 reviston of GM guideline 
mentioned: 
The Board presently has thirteen members. It is the sense of the Board that a size of 
fifteen is about right. However, the Board would be willing to go to a somewhat 
larger size in order to accommodate the availability of an outstanding candidate(s). 
Each director generally has one- to three-year term, depending on the articles of 
incorporation and bylaws. The renewal of election as a board member is rarely restricted. 
80 percent of companies had a mandatory retirement age for their directors in 1993. The 
larger their revenues, the higher the proportion of mandatory retirement ages established. 
Companies limiting terms of service for directors rather than a stated retirement policy 
counted 10 percent only.39 Again as an example, the GM guideline described:40 
The Board does not believe it should establish term limits. While term limits could 
help insure that there are fresh ideas and viewpoints available to the Board, they hold 
the disadvantage of losing the contribution of Directors who have been able to 
develop, over a period of time, increasing insight into the Company and its operations 
and, therefore, provide an increasing contribution to the Board as a whole. As an 
alternative to term limits, the Committee on Director Affairs, in consultation with the 
Chief Executive Officer and the Chairman of the Board, will formally review each 
Director's continuation on the Board every five years. This will also allow each 
Director the opportunity to conveniently confirm his/her desire to continue as a 
The Roles of the Board of Directors under Corporate Governance Systems 
member of the Board. 
According to a survey of the Investor Responsibility Research Center, 57 percent 
of major listed companies have "staggered" terms of three years. At a three-year 
staggered board, one-third of the directors is elected each year.41 The staggered board 
gained its popularity during the takeover wave in 80's, because it helps prevent the drastic 
replacement of entire board members in a short period of time. 
Compensations for directors. The predominant form of cash compensation for 
outside director is the combination of an annual fee and per-meeting fees, with 90 percent 
of corporations' use. 88 percent of companies also pay compensation for sub-committee 
services. The average total compensation in 1993 was $36,556, including sub-committee 
fees. Although the annualized increase rate of compensations exceeded the corresponding 
inflation rate, this increase was not sufficient to compensate for the increase of required 
time commitments. On average, cash compensation per hour of service slightly declined. 
Other benefits than cash compensation also included travel expense reimbursement (95 
percent), directors' liability insurance (88 percent), the option to defer board fees (67 
percent), and pension plans (51 percent). With regard to the level of cash compensation 
and other benefits, the size of corporation matters significantly. As expected, the larger 
the company, the higher and the wider the compensations. 
An emerging trend in early 90's is to tie directors' compensation with the 
company's stock. At 55 percent of all companies and at 71 percent of the largest 
industrials in 1993, board members received additional compensation in the form of 
41 Fukao Financial Integration. Corporate Governance, and the Performance of Multinational Companies 1995, p98 
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company stock. Stock options were the most popular method with more than a half of the 
55 percent, followed by stock grants and restricted grants. In addition, 32 percent of 
surveyed companies require their directors to own some stocks of the company. By the 
time of this report, compensations with the company stock have gained further popularity. 
When the board' performance is evaluated, the nominating committee within the 
board plays a role at 69 percent of companies. However, the CEO also often plays a role, 
at 33 percent.43 
42 Korn/Ferry International Twenty-first Annual Board of Directors Study 1994, pp8-10 
43 Korn/Ferry International Twenty-first Annual Board of Directors Study 1994, ppl2 
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INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
Overview 
Issues surrounding corporate governance are inter-related. Although the focus of 
this paper is the role of boards, merely looking at the boards of directors is not sufficient. 
Instead, studies need to be made in the context of entire governance systems. Therefore, 
before we start international comparison, the central issue that every corporate governance 
system has to address is to be examined. 
Although the challenges in governing modern corporations are shared among 
developed countries, corporate governance systems show significant differences by 
nations. Accordingly, the roles and optimal arrangements of the board of director differ, 
depending on the needs from entire governance system. Later in this section, comparison 
is made among three nations' governance system: namely, American, Japanese, and 
German. The purpose of comparison is not to determine which is superior to which, but to 
identify boards' characteristics in each system, which can be implemented in seeking the 
optimal arrangement for the board of directors. 
Common Challenges in Governing Modern Corporations 
Limited liability companies. Modern businesses, both in production and in 
distribution, are often too large and expensive for an individual to own, and therefore 
require partial ownership by a number of investors. Investors also prefer to diversify their 
investment portfolios to mitigate the unique risk of a corporation by making small units of 
15 
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alone is not motivated to serve as a monitor, for the following reasons. 
Monitoring requires time and efforts, and every shareholder cannot or is not 
willing to spend resources. The costs of monitoring can easily exceed the potential 
benefit, only a small fraction of the gain. Therefore, for many investors who seek 
diversity and liquidity in their portfolios, required resource commitment for monitoring is 
inconsistent with their interests.47 Even if some shareholders were capable of monitoring, 
they would not like other shareholders to "free-ride" on their time and efforts. Thousands 
of monitors can never be required for one company, and each shareholder seeks 
opportunity to free-riding other shareholders as a monitor. 
Self-interested opportunism. Because no shareholder is willing to be involved in 
monitoring or controlling the corporations they invested, managers' discretion over the 
allocation of investors' fund become significant. Although laws to some extent help limit 
the occasions that managers simply expropriate cash, get excessive compensation, and 
benefit from out-of-market transfer pricing, too luxurious offices and company airplanes 
are commonly observed. More importantly, managers use their discretion to pursue 
projects that benefit them than shareholders, such as for the private benefits of control or 
for excessive diversification. 
Managers, devoting their time for a corporation, are in a different position from 
investors in terms of diversification. While investors enjoy liquidity and diversification in 
their portfolios, managers' personal wealth and human capital is tied to the corporation. 
46 R 0 e Strong Managers Weak Owners 1996, p6 
47 Blair Ownership and Control 1995, p33 
48 Shleifer and Vishny "A Survey of Corporate Governance" 1997, p742 
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Managers are, by nature, motivated to seek diversification of the corporation by making 
wide range of investments unrelated to its core business, potentially sacrificing the 
. . 49 
efficiencies from specialization. 
Finally, managers can expropriate shareholders by entrenching themselves and 
staying on the job, even if they are no longer competent or qualified to run the firm. Some 
argues that the difficulty in replacing poor managers is the costliest item among the 
agency problems. 
Boards as agents. A collective action problem among shareholders explains the 
reason why owners are not willing to monitor the appropriate usage of their own wealth. 
Shareholders, scared with managers' self-interested opportunism, then naturally choose to 
hire somebody as a collective monitor on their behalf. A collective monitor, instead of 
deep involvement of numbers of shareholders, saves monitoring costs. In addition, having 
a collective agent brings about the benefit of coordinating various shareholders' interests, 
which are not necessarily identical. Risk preference is one example of the source of 
difference among shareholders, and the intended length of shareholding is the other. If 
functioning properly, the boards of directors are expected to deliver shareholders' unified 
voice to management to the best of shareholders' interests as a whole. 
However, as easily imagined, boards as agents create another principal-agent 
problem. The historically typical "rubber stamps" for CEOs are a clear example. 
Appointment and dismissal as directors are often controlled by CEOs instead of 
shareholders, and each director is likely to try to secure his/her job by saying nothing to 
49 Miller "Is American Corporate Governance Fatally Flawed?" 1997, pp42-43 
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management. In line with the manager-shareholder agency problem, board-shareholder 
relationship should be carefully coordinated. In fact, most protective techniques for the 
manager agency problem are also applicable to boards. 
Common approaches to agency problems. It is found that the well-functioning 
governance systems around the world show some common characteristics. For example, 
Shleifer and Vishny conclude that "the U.S., Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom 
have some of the best corporate governance systems in the world, and the differences 
between them are probably small relative to their differences from other countries-
According to Shleifer and Vishny, two most common approaches, both of which rely on 
giving investors some power, are legal protection and concentrated ownership. Good 
governance systems, as observed in industrialized nations, commonly make the best use of 
these two approaches. 
Legal protection is a relatively direct approach, which assures owners' rights to 
influence corporate control. Managers' and directors' duty of loyalty supplements the 
voting rights of shareholders. Laws commonly restrict managerial self-dealings and other 
conflicting activities with shareholders' interests. Legal systems play an important role 
especially for minority shareholders, who do not possess other practically effective 
protections. 
Concentrated ownership provides a certain group of shareholders with the 
incentive to monitor managerial operations. A substantial ownership, leading to large 
proportion of rights to cash flows, motivates such a shareholder to gather information and 
50 Shleifer and Vishny "A Survey of Corporate Governance" 1997, pp742-743 
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monitor the management for its own interest. Thus, the substantial shareholder is less 
concerned about the other small free riders. As importantly, the existence of enough 
voting control to put pressure to the management discourages managers and directors to 
act for their own interests instead of shareholders'.51 
Difference by Nations and Potential Convergence 
Market-based vs. relationship-based. Despite the above similarities in broad 
sense, scholars have more enthusiastically identified substantial differences among the 
governance systems in developed countries. Comparisons are often made between two 
representative models: the Anglo-American model and the Japanese/German model. The 
Anglo-American model, observed in the U.S. and the U.K., is often described as a 
"market-based" system. Japanese/German model, observed in Japan, Germany, and other 
continental European nations, is often described as a "relationship-based" model. 
In short, the market-based Anglo-American model relies on efficient capital 
markets with large transaction volume. Stock prices quoted at market are considered the 
measure of corporate performances, and thus, the value-creation for shareholders is 
considered the first priority of corporate activities. The markets of corporate control, or 
takeovers through tender offers, play an important role. Widely dispersed shareholdings, 
with relatively strong legal protection for minority shareholders, are also important 
characteristics.52 Reflecting these, the primary role of boards is an independent monitor of 
management on behalf of dispersed minor shareholders. 
51 Shleifer and Vishny "A Survey of Corporate Governance" 1997, pp737-739 and 750-758 
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The relationship-based Japanese/German model heavily relies on monitoring and 
controlling by large shareholders, particularly large banks and inter-corporate holding. 
These large shareholders, which are creditors or product purchasers at the same time, tend 
to hold the company stock in the long term, as a token of stable business relationships. 
Stable large shareholders, which also retain managerial interaction and information 
sharing within business groups, are expected to serve as effective monitors. Another 
characteristic of Japanese/German model is the strong representation of employees. As a 
result, corporate activities do not focus on "pure" shareholders' interest as clearly as the 
Anglo-American system does. Both relationship investors and employees possess 
representation of their interests at the boards of directors either directly or indirectly.53 
Potential convergence. Constant improvement in operational effectiveness is 
necessary to win the competition, and the corporate governance system is not an 
exception. Especially when the competition takes place on global basis, relative 
inefficiency in governance system against other nations makes the costs of necessary 
resources high throughout the nation, and its economy may suffer a death spiral. The 
acceleration of studies in governance systems of other nations by American scholars and 
the success of Japanese/German companies in product competitions, both occurred in late 
80's, are not coincidental. 
Although global competition somewhat drives studies and implementation of 
more efficient corporate governance systems both by corporations and by nations, few, if 
any, believes that the systems are going to converge into one optimal system on global 
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basis. That is because each nation or economic block has its own history, culture, and 
resource constraints, as backgrounds of the current governance system.54 There have been 
arguments about the degree of convergence; however, the bottom line is that simply 
looking for the most effective system around the world and imitating it do never work. 
As the governance system as a whole retain differences by economic blocks, the 
roles of boards in it should be different. However, it is worthwhile to study the advantages 
of governance systems and corresponding roles of boards, and to consider whether such 
arrangements fit to the particular economic block in question. Again, various systems 
around the world have been studied and compared, particularly since late 80's, and these 
studies identified lots of similarities and differences. Each system has advantages and 
disadvantages, and no system is regarded ideal. The American system, although generally 
regarded as working well, possibly have rooms for improvement by implementing 
advantages of the other governance systems. 
The American System 
Dispersed ownership. The limited liability system is common in developed 
countries and not unique to the U.S. What is unique to the U.S. is its high degree of 
dispersion of equity ownership. The U.K. is the only other major country that 
demonstrates the same degree of dispersed ownership, and concentrated ownership with 
influential shareholders is often observed in many other industrial countries like Germany 
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and Japan. 
Under highly dispersed ownership, the voting power of any individual 
shareholder is not influential, and formingg groups to enhance collective influence on 
managemeng is considered difficult and costly.55 Therefore, the collective action problem 
among shareholders is substantial, and monitoring and influencing management through 
the board of directors has an essential role under the governance system. 
Financial intermediaries. Even though ultimate fund providers, or owners, are 
distant individuals, they may be able to influence management through powerful financial 
intermediaries: namely, banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and pens.on funds, 
each holding trillions dollars of assets. However in the U.S., it is not the case. There are a 
lot of systematic impediments for intermediaries to have influential blocks. Banks have 
been prohibited from either operating throughout the nation or making stock investment. 
Mutual funds are discouraged to own control blocks. Insurers can put only a fragment of 
their investment portfolios into any one from owning any one company's stock. Pension 
funds are fragmented and securities rules discourage them to act jointly. Various laws or 
ruling, such as portfolio rules and anti-networking rules, have prohibited or raised the cos. 
of institutional influence.56 
There are many examples of banking and securities legislation that discourage or 
prohibit banks and large investors from supervising corporate management. These laws 
include the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Ac. of 1934, the 
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Investment Company Act of 1940, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, and the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.57 Large institutional investors such 
as mutual funds have been discouraged their concentrated ownership in a particular 
company by the Investment Company Act58 and the Employee Retirement Income 
Roe claims that these restrictions on financial institutions are strongly related to 
politics affecting lawmakers.60 Legal and regulatory constraints against the broad 
oversight authority of financial intermediaries can be largely attributed to a strong populist 
political undercurrent against Wall Street, which makes the best use of public concerns 
and the political system. 
M&A market for control. It is a common belief that a fairly vigorous M&A 
market, together with dispersed shareholders, characterizes the American governance 
system. The takeover wave in 80's helped the U.S. firms achieve the efficiencies of 
specialization by sharpening the corporate focus. Conglomerates that had diversified 
beyond rationales were taken over, and their business lines were broken down and sold off 
to different buyers.62 
A large number of theories and evidences support that takeovers typically 
increase the combined value of the target and acquiring firm. The change of control often 
removes poor-performing managers, leads to distribution of the firms to investors over 
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time, and increase profits afterwards. Even the reasonable threats of becoming a target, 
supported by a vast liquid capital market, provide managers with pressure to operate the 
company efficiently and to maintain a stock price high. 
The effectiveness of takeovers as a corporate governance mechanism has been 
questioned, however. First, hostile takeovers are a politically vulnerable mechanism. In 
fact, managerial lobbies successfully put pressures to obtain state anti-takeover legislation, 
and contributed to ending the takeover wave of 80s. State officials tend to be inclined 
more to management and employees in the state as taxpayers than to nation-wide or 
worldwide investors. Second, takeovers are too expensive to address minor performance 
failures at earlier stage. When this blunt outside force takes place, managerial problems 
are too significant and late treatments are accompanied with huge social costs. 
Nevertheless, the fact that takeovers are the critical element of the American corporate 
governance system can hardly be questioned. 
Economic background. There are several economic reasons that have supported 
the dispersed ownership particularly in the U.S. Historically, the economies of scale were 
more substantial in the U.S. due to the size of its market, than in other countries with 
geographically or politically separated smaller markets. Rapid developments in 
technologies accelerated benefits from not only scale-efficiencies but also professional 
management. Selected professional managers, who efficiently manage complicated 
businesses and devote their time and effort, have been often capable of performing better 
63 Shleifer and Vishny "A Survey of Corporate Governance" 1997, pp756-757 
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than wealthy owner-managers perform. 
Competition in product market, as well as labor and capital, has been enhanced. 
As a result, managers had only limited opportunities to steal corporate wealth by self-
dealing, unless they sacrifice corporate performance and consequently their reputation in 
managing corporations. Moreover, strict rules of conflict of interests, proxy contests, and 
takeover respectively served as threats to managers' unreasonable behaviors. The 
potential costs of dispersed ownership have been reduced, although no solution was 
complete and perfect.64 
The fact that net benefit of dispersed ownership is positive is not sufficient. In 
order to survive in increasing international competition, costs have to be minimized and 
net benefit has to be maximized. That is why many scholars have devoted to identify 
systematic problems and to come up with modifications of the governance system. 
The Japanese System 
Insider-dominated boards Most directors of Japanese corporations are 
nominated out of senior employees, and approved by a simple majority at shareholders' 
meetings. Because most board members are concurrently executive officers of the 
corporation, the expected role of the board has been an execution of business rather than 
monitoring. The board of directors elects one or more of its members to represent the 
corporation to deal with third parties, and one of the representative directors is named 
64 Roe Strong Managers Weak Owners 1996, pp7-8 
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president, the most powerful person equivalent to the CEO and Chairman.65 All important 
business decisions are made at senior officers' meeting, and same issues are discussed at 
the board meeting only when the articles of incorporation require. Consequently, the 
practical distinction between directors and senior officers is not clear. 
The term of a director cannot be longer than two years, and a two-third majority 
of shareholders can dismiss a director with or without cause. In practice, becoming a 
director is regarded as a necessary pass to be promoted to a high-tier management officer, 
under the lifetime employment practice. Therefore, the size of boards, as a pool of 
candidates for senior officers, has been big as many as 50 in some largest corporations. 
Silent shareholders. Shareholders of Japanese corporations are silent at 
shareholders meeting, although they retain broader voting rights including total 
compensation for directors and the amount of dividend. The main root lies on the 
historical view on limited liability corporations. While the American law regards limited 
liability corporations as a modified form of partnerships and regards shareholders rights as 
inherent to owners, the Japanese legal structure is not clear regarding the ownership of 
corporation. The current Japanese commercial laws were prepared in 1950 under the 
strong influence of the U.S., and shareholders' rights are often considered given by law, as 
opposed to inherent rights.66 
There are other systematic reasons of silent shareholding. In addition to the 
existence of long-term relationship shareholders as described below in detail, racketeers 
against corporations have historically prevented individual shareholders from active 
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involvement in shareholders meetings. Even in 1995, the 70-75% of listed Japanese 
corporations held their annual shareholders' meeting at 10am on June 29. The main 
purpose of this is to avoid heavy involvement of sokai-ya, the racketeers who require 
unlawful payments from corporations with the threat to disturb shareholders meetings. 
Including the above example, various preventive systems against sokai-ya results in the 
difficulty for any shareholders to be active. 
Main banks and cross-ownership. Most listed Japanese corporations maintain 
"main bank relationships". This relationship with major commercial banks combines the 
provision of debt capital and equity ownership, which is often reciprocal. With banks' 
position as lead lenders and major shareholders, they enjoy preferred status in a wide 
range of financial services. Main banks have involved themselves deeply in the affairs of 
their client companies. Detailed disclosure of corporate strategies and investment plans 
are frequently required, and bank executives occasionally require modification of these 
plans. 
Main banks are also important providers of directors to many Japanese 
corporations. One or more members of a typical Japanese board are former executives of 
the corporation's main bank. It is a common practice in Japan that retiring senior 
managers who failed to be promoted to the banks' own boards are placed in second career 
as directors of client companies. Moreover, when a corporation faces financial distress or 
serious managerial difficulties, main-bank involvement in the affairs of the corporation 
become dramatic. Main banks often send the new president out of their employees, take a 
66 Okushima "Japanese Corporate Governance. Adopting to Globalization" 1996. pp53-54 
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leadership role in restructuring, and even coordinate mergers.68 
Same sort of close relationships among industrial corporations are also popular. 
As a token of stable business relationships between suppliers and purchasers, they 
reciprocally hold stocks of trade counterparts. Commercial relationships between them 
are not exclusive, but grant preferred status. The transfers of managers and directors as 
their second career are also common. 
So-called keiretsus, or complex group of companies, are formed either 
horizontally around major banks or vertically around large industrial corporations. 
Typical characteristics of relationships within each group are implicit contracting, 
management transfers and human network, extensive information sharing, and selective 
intervention by core shareholders to force adjustment.69 Although quite a few of these 
activities are justified by owning stocks, the capacity of core shareholders is far beyond 
those of mere shareholders'. Other minor shareholders have historically relied on this 
systematic monitoring and adjustment, and have not found the necessity of their own 
activism. 
Future perspective. As the Japanese relationship-based system forms closed 
groups and somewhat disturbs pure competitions, it had served as the barriers against 
foreign entrants to Japanese market. Foreign nations, particularly the U.S., have put 
pressure to remove the sources of unfair treatments through the government to 
government discussion. Meanwhile, since early 90's Japanese economies have been 
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experiencing severe downturns. With greatly declined stock prices, public shareholders 
came to believe that monitoring and adjustment within keiretsu groups and by main banks 
did not function as expected. It was a natural movement that Japanese policy makers and 
business communities tried to revisit their governance system. 
The long history of neglecting shareholders' rights is currently under adjustment. 
For example, the stockholder derivative suit is increasing its importance, as the means for 
minor individual shareholders to influence management. In 1993, Japanese commercial 
laws were modified and the cost of derivative suits was reduced significantly. While there 
were only 10 derivative suits for 40 years before 1993 modification, there were 145 cases 
filed in 1994. ° This movement substantially contributed to educating directors the 
necessity of accountability in performing their duties. 
Business leaders from various Japanese listed companies, including banks and 
industrial corporations, formed the Corporate Governance Forum of Japan in 1994, and 
issued reports with recommendations to change in 1997 and 1998. Its recommendations 
are, in short, highly in line with what the American system has been and is seeking for. 
They emphasize the accountability of management through disclosure to public, and 
independent monitoring function of the boards of directors distinguished from business 
execution. They admit that necessary legal reforms and the development of market for 
outside directors need time.71 However, quite a few corporations have already started 
reforming their institutional arrangements, such as the separation of the executive 
directors from the corporate decision-making unit. 
70 Sakamaki "Changing Shareholders and Shareholders' Rights" 1996, ppl26-127 
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The German System 
Two-tier structure. Unlike the U.S. and Japan, the German commercial law 
obligates publicly owned and listed corporations to have two-tiered boards. A 
management board is a decision-making body on most matters, with day-to-day executive 
authority over the company. Usually five to fifteen full-time members of this board, each 
having three to five years, are appointed by the supervisory board. This supervisory board 
is specialized purely overseeing the management and separated from business execution. 
Employees elect the half of usually 9 to 22 members of the supervisory board, with fixed 
term of up to five years, and shareholders appoint the other half. These shareholders 
representatives are commonly elected from the executive ranks of other corporations and 
banks. Because the firms to which directors belong often have a major stakes in the 
company, they can practically act as representatives of, and monitors for, other 
72 
constituencies than shareholders. 
No one can be a member of both the management board and the supervisory 
board of one company. Shareholders meetings determine the compensation for the 
members of supervisory boards, and supervisory boards determine that for the members of 
management boards.73 In this regard, the German system clearly separates the executive 
function from monitoring by two-tier system, and quite differs from Japanese. However, 
the important similarity is that boards consist of representatives of employees and other 
71 Corporate Governance Forum of Japan Corporate Governance Principles - A Japanese View - 1998, pp40-58 
72 Kester "Governance. Contracting, and Investment Horizons" 1997, pp236-237 
73 Fukao Financial Integration. Corporate Governance, and the Performance of Multinational Companies 1995, p100 
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constituencies, instead of purely focusing on shareholders' interest. 
Hausbanken. German major banks' influence on corporate affairs is as 
substantial as Japanese. In addition to their substantial direct shareholding, particularly 
for largest industrial corporations, the role as depositories leverages banks' voting rights. 
Banks as depositories are practically permitted to vote on behalf of the depositors. 
Hausbanken is comparable to Japanese main banks, with regard to long-term 
shareholding and long histories of lender-borrower relationships. For example, until the 
merger with Chrysler, the chairman of the supervisory board of Daimler-Benz came from 
Deutsche Bank. In fact, Deutsche Bank engineered the merger of the Mercedes and Benz 
automotive companies, when their financial distress took place.74 
Cozy community. Germany has a relatively small circle of corporations, and 
executives dominating large business are closely tied in inter-locking boards. In 1984, 79 
percent of the German supervisory boards of largest companies had one or more board 
members who concurrently served on the management board of other major companies. 
Eight large banks and insurance companies accounted for more than 45% of inter-locking 
links. In 1987, Deutsche Bank's 12 management board members served on the 
supervisory boards of 150 listed companies, and as an extreme case, one bank executive 
participated in 42 different supervisory boards within 15 years. 
Opportunistic behaviors in such a cozy community severely harm the reputation 
of managers and directors, as a major breach of trust, because the small circle of 
executives provides opportunities for effective information sharing among them. How a 
74 Kester "Banks in the Boardroom" 199_, pp72-73 
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businessperson serves as the member of boards, either management or supervisory, is 
easily observed by other executives sitting at the same boards. Board members with poor 
performance are dismissed based on widespread information within the community, and 
vice versa.75 The close knit of core executives in the German business community helps 
them monitor the performance as directors one another with a penalty of dismissal, and 
this provides shareholders and other constituencies with comfort. 
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WHOSE INTEREST BOARDS SHOULD SERVE 
Revisiting the Shareholder Principle 
Backgrounds. Through studies in the governance systems of other industrial 
nations under the intensified global competition, the overemphasis on stock prices and 
shareholder returns in the American governance system became questioned. A typical 
argument includes that the quarter-to-quarter focus of investors pressures American 
companies into under-investing in relatively intangible assets. A shortsighted, or myopic, 
feature of corporate management prevents them from long-term investments that was 
allowing Japanese and German competitors to prevail in the international market place in 
late 80's and early 90's. These long-term investments include R&D, stronger supplier 
relationships, market penetration, process improvements, and employee training.76 
As few claim that the American system is inferior to other nations' governance 
systems, which have their own disadvantages, the basic idea of the shareholder principle is 
rarely questioned. However, various modifications to the American systems, 
incorporating advantages of others, are proposed. Some of them claim that it is beneficial 
to give constituencies other than shareholders the voice to influence the management of 
corporations. 
In virtually every jurisdiction, it is a common practice that shareholders elect the 
board of directors under widely dispersed ownership to have directors represent 
shareholders interests. At the same time, balancing the needs and goals of multiple 
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stakeholders has got to be increasingly expected, to achieve effective political-economic 
systems in the long run. Some claim that other stakeholders' lack of efficient way to 
represent their interests indicates the necessity for the boards to take their interests into 
11 
consideration. As the first step to consider how the boards of directors should function, 
consideration is made regarding whom boards should be loyal to. 
Expectations from societies. In accordance with the corporate laws in most 
states, a board owes fiduciary responsibilities to the respective corporation as a legal 
person, as opposed to its shareholders. Because the legal regulation does not define the 
boards' direct responsibilities to any particular constituencies, it is difficult to objectively 
determine whose interest corporations should serve.78 One way to address this question is 
to consider public expectations. This is partly because the expectations from societies 
form the base that drives laws and politics. Moreover, corporations and whole economic 
systems that conflict with societies would face inefficiencies in procuring various 
necessary resources, and thus lose their competitiveness. 
What a society expects for corporations is, in short, to generate economic value 
for the entire society. The economic value here includes economic profits of the 
corporations, and spilled-over benefits to the society, such as stable employment and 
stable business with other entities. We first examine the profit of the corporations, mainly 
capital providers' concern, and second look at other social benefits, mainly other 
constituencies' concern. 
77 Weston et al. Takeovers. Restructuring, and Corporate Governance 1997, pp393-394 
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Equity and Debt 
Shareholders. Corporations generate economic profits by making investment in 
the projects whose rates of return exceed required costs of capital. When corporations 
successfully add value through investments, capital providers' wealth increases 
accordingly. The necessary funds can be provided to corporations in essentially two ways, 
debt and equity. Because debt holders' claim to the corporations is limited to pre-agreed 
principal repayment and interest, the increase in value of debt is limited. On the extreme 
assumption that the debt is risk free, all the economic value added is for equity holders. In 
this case, generating economic profits for the corporations as societies expect is solely for 
shareholders' interest. 
Here, it is important to note that shareholders mean not only those who directly 
provided corporations with funds but also those who purchased stocks in secondary 
markets. Ethical obligations of a corporation may be regarded as limited to the direct fund 
providers. However, unless the corporation commits its responsibilities to secondary 
shareholders, nobody wants to invest its fund in the secondary market with the danger of 
its wealth being destroyed. If the secondary market fails to function, the liquidity of 
stocks initially offered become limited. As a result, the corporation fails to attract 
investors in the initial offering. Due to this cascade effect, it is unavoidable for every 
corporation to commit its loyalty to any shareholders in future. 
Debt holders. In addition to shareholders, debt holders are also concerned about 
the corporate activities, in reality. Increase in free cash flows supports the certainty of 
78 Blair Ownership and Control 1995, p58 
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debt service, decreases financial distress risks and required rate of return, and increases the 
market value of debts (or, the present value of debt service commitments). More 
importantly, some corporate activities can cause so-called "uncompensated wealth 
transfer" from debt holders to equity holders. For example, if a corporation undertakes a 
riskier project than its existing business with substantial new debt ranked pari passu, the 
risk of existing debts would increase without compensation. As another, extreme 
example, a corporation may try to raise a senior debt and to pay all the funds out as 
dividend to shareholders. The higher the debt ratio is, the more substantial the impact and 
risk of "wealth stealing" are. These activities should be discouraged, because such wealth 
transfers never generate overall value to the society and somewhat destroy a sound debt 
market. Unless debt holders' interests are reasonably protected for the term of debts at 
least, nobody wants to provide corporations with funds as debts. Consequently, 
corporations face difficulty to raise funds necessary for profitable investment 
opportunities, which increase societies' overall wealth. In this regard, the boards' blind 
loyalty to maximizing shareholders' wealth is problematic. 
To determine the degree of necessity to protect debt holders' interest as a role of 
the boards, there are several factors to be considered, in the context of contractual 
protections' availability. The first consideration is how debt holders are knowledgeable. 
In standard practice, the debt contract upon issuance includes negative covenants, which 
often restrict additional debt raising and excessive dividend payments without prior 
consent. Upon the breach of covenants, the debt holders can accelerate debt repayments 
and enforce securities. As long as debt holders have powers and capabilities to include 
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these protections into contracts and to proceed legal settlements, they can retain a much 
stronger contractual position than shareholders can. Second, the situation of the relevant 
economy and industry matters. In a stable industry with well-established technologies, the 
pressure to make investments could be relatively low in general. In this case, corporations 
are likely to accept strict covenants with debt holders, who consequently are strongly 
protected by contracts. However, corporations in developing, revolutionary industries are 
eager to retain their flexibility, so that they can develop competitiveness in timely 
manners. Too strict covenants, in favor of debt holders' contractual rights, are often 
unfeasible in practice. For example, the limitation to raise additional funds causes the 
delay in investment execution. With the strict requirement to disclose business plans, 
corporations bear substantially high risks that others steal or imitate those business ideas 
before successfully building the first-mover advantages. 
The boards of directors should take debt holders' interest into consideration, 
because debt holders cannot rely solely on their contract. Even though bankers are 
knowledgeable enough to impose contractual protections, the costs of losing corporations' 
flexibility are often not low enough to be justified. In addition, it might be beneficial for 
other constituencies, too, to include debt holders' representatives in the boards. Debt 
holders' representatives, highly likely experienced bankers, own expertise to control 
corporations through their wide knowledge and experience in other industries. 
There are several ways to achieve debt holders' representation at the boards. One 
way is to allow and encourage debt holders to own equity as well, and to have them 
represent their interest through their status as shareholders. However, their internal 
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conflict of interests, with both caps as debt holders and shareholders, is likely to be an 
issue. It may be viewed as a mere transfer of the conflict from a corporation to a 
stakeholder. The other way to achieve debt holders' representation is to include some 
board members as representatives of debt holders. This notion is simple as a concept, but 
complicated to implement. For example, there is not a debt holders' meeting relevant to 
the shareholders' meeting, which elects and dismisses directors. 
Other Constituencies 
Employees. Societies might expect other benefits to corporations, in addition to 
profit generation. One example is to generate stable employment. Employees are another 
group of constituencies of corporations, and will be benefited by job securities. For 
example in Japan, as already discussed, the implicit contracts between a corporation and 
its employees are generally in long-term, often the lifetime long. This employment 
security provides employees with comforts in devoting their time and effort to acquire 
firm-specific skills. At the same time, this implicit long-term commitment from 
employees provides corporations with comforts in making investments for employee 
training and education. This entire system remains efficient, as long as the social 
preference to such a long-term stable employment is reasonably strong. However, if the 
social expectation diminishes, the inherent costs of the illiquid market of labor exceed the 
benefit. 
Currently, the costs and benefits of employment securities widely vary by 
jurisdictions. The cost for corporations, or societies, to commit job securities is to lose 
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flexibility. Labor costs become deemed fixed costs rather than variable costs, and it 
become more difficult for corporations to stop particular business and to reallocate 
resources under bearish situations. Although committing to secure employment, instead 
of jobs, could be easier particularly for corporations diversified in terms of either 
industries or geographic business portfolio, still certain level of costs is unavoidable. 
Moreover, the highly diversified form of business is believed to bear the cost of 
inefficiency in control. On the other hand, the benefits for employees, or societies, depend 
on historical and cultural backgrounds. When the size of economy is large enough and the 
liquid labor market is developed as in the U.S., the benefits from job securities are limited. 
When employees are eager to stay in the small geographic area due to either physical 
reasons such as language or cultural preference, the small size of economy may prevent 
societies from absorbing fluctuation in economic situations. In this regard, the levels of 
costs and benefits are positively correlated. When employees find high benefits of 
employment securities, corporations' costs to commit employment are also high. 
Employees are usually paid pre-determined salaries to compensate their time and 
efforts, and thus, contractual relationship between corporations and employee is relatively 
clear. In this regard, it is not necessary for boards to protect employees' interests further, 
at least in such jurisdictions with liquid markets of employment as the U.S. 
Suppliers and customers. A long-term relationships with suppliers and 
customers, or network externalities for a business community, is another example of 
spilled-over benefits that society might expect. Long-term relationships help societies 
keep stable economic activities as well as firm-specific investments, but the same trade-off 
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as job securities applies. Stability can be achieved only at the cost of losing flexibility. In 
fact, many manufacturers in the U.S. have implemented a part of Japanese-style to 
facilitate the just-in-time process, and have proved that a strong commitment to suppliers 
can, at least occasionally, be a more effective system than a heavy reliance on arms-length 
79 
transactions. 
While the commitment to suppliers by corporations can be beneficial to the entire 
society, it should not be concluded that suppliers should retain influential powers of 
corporate control. Suppliers' control of a corporation leads to self-dealing, a serious threat 
against fair competitions. In case of Japan, two kinds of keiretsu support its system 
without unreasonably sacrificing competition. First, the industrial (or vertical) keiretsu is 
accompanied by a substantial cross ownership, which makes suppliers' interests in line 
with shareholders. Second, the main bank (or horizontal) keiretsu provides the third 
parties who coordinate transactions within the group, particularly a main bank. These 
third parties are expected to mitigate the threat of self-interested deals, which are likely to 
occur in case of the direct control. However, such broad systems to reduce the costs of 
supplier relationships, as represented by Japanese keiretsu, are hardly applied to other 
jurisdictions, because their effects on other parts of governance systems are too 
significant. Instead, contractual arrangements can be, and actually are, commonly 
implemented. 
It is common and natural for suppliers (or customers) and a corporation to engage 
formal contracts for their transactions. Any terms and conditions can be agreed, after 
79 Fukao Financial Integration, Corporate Governance, and the Performance of Multinational Companies 1995, pp2-3 
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arms-length negotiation. If a corporation's investment to build long-term supplier 
relationship is economically justified, it can engage in with suppliers accordingly. The 
increasing competition in the technology market, establishment of access to a supplier 
network, is expected to accelerate the necessity of proper supplier relationship.81 
Whatever the change in supplier/customer relationship is, the bottom line is that suppliers 
and customers can be easily protected by contracts. 
Conclusion 
Priority in boards' loyalty. The boards of directors should be loyal primarily to 
shareholders, for two reasons. First, societies' expectation to maximize overall wealth can 
be well interpreted as shareholders' value maximization. Second, shareholders, who can 
claim residuals only, are the least contractually protected stakeholders. The claims from 
debt holders and employees are clearly defined, and therefore, rights defined in clear 
written contracts are easily supported by court. The limited contractual protections for 
shareholders lead to their necessity of controlling management through the boards. 
This does not mean that other constituencies' interests can be completely ignored, 
however. It can be beneficial to include other constituencies' representation, particularly 
for debt holders, although the significance of benefits somewhat depends on the 
background of industry and society. Considerations should be made, first, whether the 
representation at boards is the best way to take other constituencies' interests in to 
account. If yes, second considerations are how to have them represent, whether through 
80 Kester "Governance. Contracting, and Investment Horizons" 1997, pp230-235 
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holding stocks or through invitation. If the latter applies, shareholders face a trade-off 
between the dilution of stakes at boards and the benefits from retaining flexibility, and 
other constituencies face a trade-off between obtaining representation at boards and 
forgiving some of their direct protections. Systematic decision-making processes, which 
judge the degree of other constituencies' involvement in boards from individual 
circumstances of corporations, should be developed. 
Answer to the criticism as myopic. The shareholder-value principle, measuring 
corporations' value creation by stock prices, has been attacked as the reason that the U.S. 
managers are not willing to make necessary long-term investments compared to German 
or Japanese. However, the shareholder-value principle or the focus on stock prices is not 
the source of problems. Instead, how capital markets function in determining stock prices 
is the issue. 
As financial theories suggest, the current market price of a stock should take all 
available information about the expectation of future cash flow into account. However in 
history, reported earnings figures have been bluntly used as a short-cut indicator of future 
cash flows, while value-creating long-term investments create burdens on the current 
earnings. As a result, the "EPS-enthralled" short-term investors have indirectly forced 
managers to increase earnings at the cost of long-term investments. Too much focus on 
current earnings can be the source of an inappropriate conflict of interest among 
shareholders. If a value-creating long-term investment drives the stock price down, short-
term shareholders dislike it and long-term shareholders like it. However, it is impossible 
81 Prahalad "Corporate Governance or Corporate Value Added" 1997, p52 
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for corporations to distinguish shareholders by their time horizons of shareholding and to 
treat them differently. This is because, for example, a long-term investor may want to sell 
stocks tomorrow, after holding them for 10 years. Stock prices should reflect long-term 
perspective, and then conflicts among investors with different investment horizons 
disappear. 
In fact, stock market participants seem to be easing their emphasis on earnings-
related figures, and to be shifting their focus towards corporations' ability to add 
economic value in the future. For example, the EVA or the Economic Value Added as 
registered trademarks of Stern Stewart & Co. is increasing its popularity as a tool to 
measure corporations' and their internal business units' performance, offering and 
diligently touting a number of advantages.83 
In summary, the shareholder-value principle is not the source of problem in the 
governance system, on the condition that capital markets properly takes the long-term 
effects of business activities into consideration. If capital markets fail to do so, 
shortsightedness of managers and conflicts among shareholders with different investment 
horizons become problems. Fortunately, recent trends indicate that the EPS-oriented 
market is moving towards more sophisticated one, in line with the generally accepted 
financial theories. Capital markets can function properly as the means for corporations to 
raise funds from investors, without harming governance systems. 
82 Chew Studies in International Corporate Finance and Governance Systems 1997, p3 
83 Millstein and MacAvoy The Active Board of Directors and Improved Performance of the Large Publicly-Traded 
Corporation 1997, pp29-32 
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WHAT BOARDS SHOULD DO 
Ordinary Course of Business 
Shareholders' direct involvement. Although corporate laws are intended to give 
shareholders a significant amount of control, the number of matters that must be submitted 
to shareholder vote is limited. These are election of directors, substantive amendments to 
the articles of incorporation, and fundamental changes outside of the companies' ordinary 
business.84 One way for shareholders to be involved in management is the "proxy 
contest," which virtually any shareholder can put at the company's expense. Through this 
attempt by dissident groups of shareholders, they are able to seek to obtain board 
representation against management proposals. However, communications among 
shareholders have been strictly restricted, though somewhat eased in 1992 in terms of the 
number of shareholders contacting, and most contests failed to win a majority.85 Although 
some effects on shareholders wealth can be observed regardless of outcome, the present 
system of proxy contests is charged as inefficient.86 
Instead of being actively involved, diversified owners choose to exit by selling 
shares at market if they are not satisfied with management. If enough shareholders exit, 
the stock price of that company goes down. This signals shareholders' dissatisfaction with 
current management, and in extreme case triggers replacement of management. 
Both proxy contests and exiting pressure admittedly work as reasonable outside 
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Issues to deal with. What boards should NOT do is the day-to-day execution of 
business. Executive officers should be professionals in managing business with full 
knowledge of the industry, and boards should concentrate on reviewing what managers do. 
Otherwise, an executive function is duplicated, and an objective monitoring function is 
lost. In monitoring and reviewing the ordinary course of business, boards should focus on 
three things: providing management with their own insights, retaining a sufficient power 
to influence management, and motivating management to act in line with shareholders 
interests. 
First, boards should provide management with their own insights, through formal 
approval processes and informal consultations. As a management team is chosen as a 
group of professionals to execute businesses, directors are chosen as professionals to 
oversee management. Boards, therefore, are expected to supplement managerial expertise 
of executive team, in addition to mere double-checking. The sources of additional insight 
include familiarity to business theories and applications, specialty in law, accounting, and 
others, and knowledge and experiences in wide range of industries. While all executive 
officers are required to have industry-specific knowledge and experiences, it is worthwhile 
to include some directors who can bring something else that the management team is hard 
to retain. In order to maximize the benefits from diversity of board members, informal 
consultations should be encouraged, even if the governing documents do not require 
formal approvals. 
Second, boards should retain a sufficient power to influence management. The 
88 Blair Ownership and Control 1995, p58 
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main source of a power is the right to evaluate and to dismiss poor executive officers 
including the CEOs, on behalf of shareholders. In order to achieve this, proper 
empowerment from shareholders and formal procedures for evaluation are necessary. 
Boards are frequently incapable of oust CEOs quickly enough.89 Even the boards 
dominated by outside directors tend to hesitate to remove top managers, unless a true 
performance disaster happens.90 It is a natural behavior that boards tend not to replace 
management until the corporate performance faces real difficulty and the situation 
becomes hard to recover. Thus, the formal procedures to trigger the replacement of 
management through evaluation are necessary. Unless the threats to lose managerial 
positions are reasonably serious, management tends to ignore boards' and shareholders' 
voices. 
Third, boards should motivate management to act in line with shareholders' 
interests, because it is easier to have management act properly from the first place than to 
force them change what was decided. Among the ways to achieve this, compensation for 
management is regarded as most effective. In order to motivate managers to act as 
owners, aligning managers' self-interest with shareholders' has a significant power. By 
compensating managers partly by the stock performance, they are encouraged to seek 
successful moves that benefit shareholders. However, this does not solve the problem 
entirely. There remains a difference between managers' and shareholders' interests, in 
terms of diversification. Shareholders in general public have, or at least are able to have, 
well diversified portfolio, and their stockholding of a particular company is a small part of 
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to make decision, substituting its own view on the proper procedure for the business 
decision of the board. Until then, the courts rarely challenged the gross negligence of 
boards.92 
The implication of the Trans Union case is the following. Boards are no longer 
able to blindly rely on the business judgment rule, which has historically protected them. 
The breach of fiduciary responsibilities can be challenged at the courts, particularly in 
such extraordinary situations as mergers. In fact, the courts' capability to question the 
fulfillment of the duty of care is still limited, because only the appearances of decision-
making process can be challenged. In case of the Trans Union, two-hour meeting without 
prior preparations and fair market value estimations clearly demonstrated the lack of 
prudent care. However, it would have been difficult for the courts to challenge the board, 
if an investment bank had issued a valuation result at the request of the Trans-Union 
board. Even if the board in reality completely ignored the opinion from the investment 
bank, the process might have seen careful enough. The essence of the outcome from the 
Trans Union case is that directors are obliged to be accountable in their decision-making 
procedures at least, although the business judgement rule still protect them from second-
guessing. 
Revion. Inc.: bpards as auctioneers. The hostile takeover battle between Pantry 
Pride, Inc. and Revlon, Inc. took place in 1985. Revlon rejected Pantry Pride's initial 
proposal of a friendly acquisition, and used several tactics to fight against the takeover. In 
addition to the then existing golden parachutes to executive officers, several major 
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defensive actions are identified. First, Revlon announced an exchange offer, increasing 
financial leverage. Revlon intended to stop Pantry Pride by reducing the equity value. 
Second, after the exchange offer proved no, strong enough to stop Pantry Pride, Revlon 
started discussion with white knights. Revlon identified more preferable acquirets than 
Pantry Pride, and had them offer higher price. Third, in the course of raising offered 
Prices, a management buyout with one of white knights was proposed. Finally, the board 
approved the white knight's latest offer with a lock-up option, which allowed it to acquire 
a part of Revlon below fair market value in case someone else acquired 40% of Revlon 
stock. 
After a lawsuit filing by Pantry Pride, Delaware Chancery Court Blocked the 
acquisition approved by the Revlon board, and the Delaware Supreme Court upheld thrs 
ruling. The courts ruled that the Revlon board had breached its duty of loyalty to 
shareholders. The lock-up option, i„ this case, precluded a bid for Revlon by anyone else 
and retarded the bidding process, although the courts approved all the other defensive 
tactocs as the maneuvers to protect shareholders from a takeover a, an inadequate price. In 
general, the implementation of defensive tactics against hostile takeover attempts go 
against shareholders' interests, because the rise of the stock price ,„ most takeover 
attempts allows shareholders to realize huge capital gain. Boards' supporting defensive 
tactics is justified, only when the threat to be acquired a, a too-low price is reasonab;y 
serious and it is worthwhile to protect shareholders from such an unfavorable deal. 
This ruling indicated that the board's proper role changes from a defender against 
a hostile acqutrer to an auctioneer attempting to secure the highest sales price, once the 
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company is put up for sale.93 With regard to the appropriate procedure the boards of 
directors should pursue, considerations are made as follows. In case that an auction 
becomes unavoidable, boards need to be indifferent to the identity of bidders and to 
commit fair treatments among them. The boards have to provide sufficient information to 
potential bidders, and encourage them to come up with the appropriate offer. 
Each bidder is expected to do its own valuation of incremental present value of 
the future cash flows, according to the individual projection of effects on the acquirer. 
When the purchase price is as high as the incremental present value, the acquirer's 
expected economic profit by the acquisition is zero. Therefore, all potential acquirers try 
to bid a price low enough to retain certain economic profit, but high enough to win the 
deal. The bottom line is that no bidder can offer the price higher than the present value, 
based on each bidder's valuation. The role of boards as auctioneers is to get the price as 
close as such a net present value, for the benefit of shareholders. In this regard, ascending 
bids auctions can be viewed as better procedure than sealed bids, in general. By allowing 
bidders to look at others' bids and to raise bidding prices, competition among them is 
enhanced. Each bidder is expected to raise its bidding up to the lower of the current 
highest bid or the present value. 
In order to stimulate proper competitions during ascending bids auctions, it is 
important that every participant, including an auctioneer, respects the determined deadline 
for bidding. However, the board might face a difficulty to achieve this. After the board 
choosing the highest bidder upon the deadline, any other bidders can come back with a 
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higher price. On one hand, if the board ignores such an offer, its loyalty to shareholders 
can be questioned. On the other hand, if the board accepts such an offer, the bidding 
deadline becomes meaningless and no bidder is encouraged to respect the deadline. 
This dilemma comes from the fact that its role as an auctioneer conflicts with its 
primary fiduciary duty of loyalty. In order to avoid this, the board had better appoint a 
third party and delegate its responsibility as an auctioneer. A professional auctioneer, such 
as an investment bank, is motivated to run an auction properly, because the reputation as 
an auctioneer matters. Any late bids can be rejected in a professional manner, and the 
board is no longer able to control the selling process due to its commitment to delegate. It 
can be hardly challenged that the board decides to delegate its responsibility as an 
auctioneer, because securing a proper bidding process is in line with shareholders' interest. 
Time, Inc.: long-term strategies. In 1989, Time was about to acquire Warner 
Communications as a friendly deal. Time considered Warner the perfect partner to merge, 
because it would help Time achieve its mid-term goals without sacrificing its long-term 
competitive advantages. Time's goals were to expand its business into global and wide 
aspects of the news and entertainment industry, so that it could retain a desired growth and 
reduce the cyclical nature of its profit due to strong link to the U.S. economy. At the same 
time, Time wanted to keep its unique organizational structure and corporate culture that 
enhances journalistic integrity, and therefore, strongly preferred to be an acquiring body. 
The boards of Time and Warner respectively approved a stock swap between them. 
Paramount Communications, then, came in with a hostile takeover bid to acquire 
Time. With the belief that Warner was the best partner, Time had several defensive and 
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put up for sale, the board is obliged to proceed an auction procedure. If not, corporate 
management and controlling boards have legal standing for strategies to create long-term 
value, even if their decision is not in line with shareholders' short-term interest. The Time 
ruling might seem to have given wider discretion to management and boards at the cost of 
shareholders' interests. 
However, upon further reflection, broadly applying the Revlon duty has a side 
effect. If auction procedures are obligated in any acquisitions, corporations and 
individuals are discouraged to seek opportunities. Identifying undervalued corporations 
and planning acquisitions require time and efforts, but public auctions allow other bidders 
to free ride on them. Even if the original planner can win the bid, it is difficult to retain 
sufficient profits to make up its effort after tough price competition in bidding. As a 
result, the number of participants in acquisitions and the chance of high-price takeovers 
decrease. 
This trade-off, namely between proper competitions and motivation for bidders, 
applies primarily ,„ the business community as a whole. However, it can apply to 
individual corporations under some circumstances. For example, let's assume tha, a 
company identified three potential targe, corporations for its strategic acquisition or 
merger. The company approached the board of one of the potential targets, and offered 
friendly acquisition. The potential acquirer has an option to approach other targets. If the 
board decides to proceed to a pubhc auction, the potential acquirer, with the chance of 
high-price offer, is likely to leave. By sucking to an auction procedure, the board may 
lose an opportunity for shareholders to increase their wealth. 
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The Time case indicated that friendly mergers or acquisitions as strategic steps do 
not automatically trigger the Revlon duty, even if the corporation looks as "up for sale". 
This precedence gives boards lots of flexibility in proceeding the change of control. When 
a friendly offer is in place, and it is a reasonable threat that competition through auction 
results in a loss of the M&A opportunity, the board can try to seek takeovers that do not 
evoke the Revlon duty. This does not deny the benefit of proper competition through 
auctions, but gives boards the flexibility in determining the best procedure depending on 
individual situations. The board can judge, with consultation with shareholders when 
appropriate, what the best way to maximize shareholders' wealth is. 
Summary. In summary, boards should react to potential takeover offers in the 
following steps. Recognizing the business judgement rule principal no longer protects it 
under extraordinary conditions such as potential change of control, the board has to do its 
own valuation of the corporation. The board should, then, determine whether the takeover 
offer is appropriately priced, taking its long-term strategies into account. If under-priced, 
the board can reject that friendly offer and conduct defensive tactics to prevent the 
potential hostile takeover, in order to protect shareholders' interest. Although courts are 
expected to support most defensive tactics in this situation, the board should avoid 
unequal treatments among bidders after its recognition that the change of control is 
unavoidable. If the offered price is at or more than the boards' own valuation, the board 
should proceed it for the sake of corporate value maximization. Here, the board should 
consider the trade-off between potential higher bids through an auction and the threat to 
miss this opportunity. The board can either proceed an auction procedure expecting the 
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highest bids possible through competition, or start exclusive discussion as a "strategic 
step". Throughout the process, the board is likely to face difficulties in performing its 
duties of care and loyalty by itself, due to conflicting interests or simply lacking 
capabilities. Therefore, it is often beneficial to hire such specialists as investment banks 
and to turn over decision-making to shareholders. 
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HOW BOARDS CAN BEST BE ORGANIZED 
Composition 
Nomination. In history, boards have been often composed of friends and 
acquaintances of the CEO, who concurrently serves as a chairman of the board. 
Management frequently nominates candidates for directors, and shareholders.without 
altemative ideas, easily approve them.95 This management-driven nomination of directors 
has been a major source of passive behaviors of boards. Therefore, it is essential for 
shareholders to appoint directors without the strong influence of management, so that 
boards retain sufficient power and influence to perform their monitoring function 
appropriately. Because not ah sharehoiders are capable of, or are willing to, find 
candidates who fit the company, needs, it is beneficial that outside board members 
nominate directors by themselves on behalf of sharehoiders. The use of independent 
nomination committees should be further emphasized. 
In nominating prospective directors, the diversity of boards shouid be carefully 
considered. As mentioned earlier, insights from directors had better supplement the 
managers expertise of executive officers,. In thts regard, including academicians, 
attorneys, and bankers is appropriate. Even though they do not possess deep industry-
specific experiences, they can contribute to management through their speitalty. Although 
business judgement and strategic management are both important functions boards as a 
whole should retain, the use of CEOs/COOs of other companies seems overemphasized in 
96 Davis"Corporate Boards in Times of "Turbulent Dhange" 1997. p280 
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the U.S. Extensive use of CEOs/COOs might make sense more in the traditional 
Japanese/German systems, which deeply rely on human networks and information sharing 
within either keiretsus or the cozy business community. Contrarily in the U.S. with the 
culture of explicit contracts and the large scale of business community, the merit of 
overemphasis in managerial professionals is limited. 
Ideally, all boards should elect their chairmen independent from the CEOs or 
senior executives, as seen in most public companies in the U.K. The concept of a lead 
director might work when the concurrent CEO and chairman is unavoidable for some 
reasons; however, it is clearly not the best. The CEOs are likely to hesitate to giving up 
their control of boards, because the truly independent boards may disturb doing their 
business as the CEOs want and may scare their managerial positions. However, such 
threat is the essence of the proactive roles of boards. It might take time, but pressures 
from institutional investors and business presses influential to capital markets are capable 
of driving the separation of chairmen from CEOs. 
Independence. Recognizing the problem that boards act too late and are not 
accountable for monitoring management, many publications since 70's have emphasized 
the accountability of boards, particularly the independence from management. Substantial 
majority of "independent" directors in the boardroom is commonly believed preferable. 
The idea behind adding more outside and independent directors is that they are likely to be 
relatively objective critics of management. 
However, there is not one publicly accepted definition of independence. Factors 
to be considered in defining the "independence" include current employment, past 
60 
Graduate Independent Research Project (FIN750-021) 
Spring/Summer 1999, University of Michigan Business School 
Ken Ichiro Soma 
61 
Graduate Independent Research Project (FIN750-02n 
Spnng/Summer 1999, University of Michigan Business School 
Ken Ichiro Soma 
The Roles of the Board of Directors under Corporate Governance Systems 
Earlier in this paper, a conclusion is made that it is beneficial to include 
representatives of other constituencies than shareholders, particularly debt holders. 
Accordingly, the genuine independence is not considered necessary, for the following 
reasons. First, while the primary aim of boards is to help increase shareholders' wealth, 
other constituencies' check not to "steal" wealth might be done at boards most effectively. 
Second, executives of firms that have business relationship are more likely to devote the 
time and energy necessary to fulfill the responsibilities, and shareholders should retain 
flexibility to send them to boards in case alternative "independent" candidates cannot be 
identified. Third, the use of outside consultants for boards' matters is expected to increase 
because of requirement to the accountability in boards' decision-making process; these 
opinions from third parties help modify the biased views of some directors, even if any 
exists. 
Sub-committees 
For audit and compensation, sub-committees have already formed at virtually 
every corporation in the U.S. The increasing use of sub-committee should be further 
encouraged, at least for the nomination of executives and directors. While it is preferable 
that boards are consisted of a vast majority of outsiders, the complete exclusion of 
executive members from boards is not considered a good idea. A few executive directors 
are able to provide industry-specific knowledge that is inevitable in making judgment, and 
also serve as liaisons between the management and the board. However, in some sort of 
issues such as auditing and compensating management, the conflicts of interests become 
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number as a size of the board, assuring that all necessary functions are covered is 
important. As long as the all functions are covered without unreasonably heavy 
workloads on a director, the smaller the better. 
Term. Any standardized term limit for individual directors is not 
recommended, because that limits flexibility in forming the most optimal team of directors 
to the extent available. Instead, boards should develop effective evaluation processes, 
which help remove directors when necessary. Companies' circumstances change, and 
boards should anticipate and respond to company changes by assembling the best mix of 
people to serve the company effectively at any given time. Moreover, directors' lives are 
dynamic and the ability of a director to serve effectively may vary with changes in the 
director's work and personal life.100 Although the continuity in boards' service is 
important, frequent renewals of the appointment of an individual director is considered 
preferable. Choosing not to renew is much easier than dismissing during the term, and 
upon each renewal shareholders get an opportunity to check the performance of directors. 
Therefore, a three-year term, most popular in the U.S., might be too long. 
The staggered boards are not encouraged, in the same context. The stability of 
board members given by the staggered structure provides both management and directors 
with unnecessary comfort. Should management and directors receive too much comfort 
for their positions, they tend to get discretion to act for their own interests instead of 
shareholders'. Even if elected frequently and simultaneously, the nomination committee 
and the shareholders can always choose to renew individual directors' terms and achieve 
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the necessary stability of boards' service. In addition, the staggered boards gained their 
popularity as a defensive tactic against hostile takeovers, in which shareholders can 
potentially increase their wealth by a rising stock price. By making the replacement of 
boards practically difficult, potential tender offers and thus the shareholders' opportunity 
to increase their wealth might be lost. 
Motivations to Boards 
Legal protection. The board of directors is an agent to oversee management on 
behalf of shareholders. However hard the independence of boards from management is 
sought, non-executive directors may have interests that are distinct from those of both 
managers and shareholders.101 Although such agency costs cannot be completely avoided, 
providing board members with motivations to perform their duties properly can reduce the 
costs. 
The direct method to have boards act properly is to rely on legal systems. That is 
to define in corporate laws how boards should act, together with measurement methods by 
courts. Whenever any stakeholders find the board failed to perform its duties properly, 
courts judge whether the board should be rectified, including monetary compensation for 
its failures. If this can be achieved, clear definition in law directly solves the weak 
contractual protection for shareholders. However, this method has limitation to the degree 
to apply. That is the conflict with the "commitment to delegate". Unless the certain level 
of freedom in business operation is granted, monitoring costs by stakeholders become 
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high. 
Self regulation. Another potential way to motivate boards to act properly is to 
design self-regulatory mechanisms within the business community. An example is seen in 
the German corporate governance system as the cozy community with reciprocal 
monitoring and information sharing. In order to build up such a framework, the 
mechanism should be authorized to penalize boards' malfunction based on case-by-case 
judgments. If such a mechanism is achieved, shareholders are required to go to courts 
only in case of "out of norm" situations. 
However, the American business community is substantially larger than the 
German, and the same reciprocal monitoring by directors cannot be expected. Therefore, 
third parties have to play a role to monitor boards' performance. One candidate for 
monitors of boards is financial intermediaries that provide stock brokerage services for 
individual investors. Because public information for investors from them can affect the 
stock price, they are deemed to possess sufficient powers to penalize boards' mal-
functioning. Governmental agencies can potentially play this role, although out of market 
intervention should be carefully avoided. Whoever the monitors are, the difficulty lies in 
how to align interests properly. Delegated monitors should have their own incentive to do 
so and should not be biased due to their own interests. 
Reputation, Because the monitoring process by third parties does not exist, the 
boards commonly evaluate their own performance. It is necessary to develop proper 
methods to evaluate individual directors, in any way. If conformance with care/loyalty 
standards of individual directors can be properly evaluated no matter what the 
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corporation's performance is, the reputation as a directors become objective and 
trustworthy. 
In order for the adverse reputation effects to effectively prevent self-interested 
behaviors of directors, the career as a director has to be attractive enough. One possible 
way is to set a directorial position as a mandatory career path to reach higher managerial 
position as seen in the traditional Japanese system, but achieving this without losing the 
majority of outside directors and small size of the board is a challenge. Instead, high level 
of compensations, which encourage competition among potential board members based on 
their reputation, may work. 
Compensations for directors. The most practical way, which is easy for 
individual corporations to implement, is to give board members monetary incentives. The 
most popular way is to tie the compensation to the corporate performance, through stock 
options for example. However, as seen in management compensations, the difference 
between positions of directors and shareholders is left, in terms of the ability to diversity. 
CONCLUSION 
Adam Smith recognized the problem caused by separation of ownership and 
control in the public corporation, and Barle and Means forcefully articulated it in 1932.102 
Compared to this long history, necessary changes to achieve proactive functions of the 
board of directors have taken place quite recently. Following the huge losses recorded by 
the American corporations in late 80>s, boards by themselves started reforming 
institutional arrangements to be accountable in overseeing management. The recent 
movements, mainly driven by emerging activism of institutional investors and by 
influential business presses, are regarded as generally in the right direction. Effective 
monitoring of management with sufficient disclosure and accountability to shareholders 
has been encouraged, and boards have sought for the independence from management. 
Boards continue to be expected to play a central role of protecting shareholders 
from managerial self-opportunism, with a primary loyalty. Because shareholders are 
required to commit to delegate overseeing functions to the boards, arrangements that 
encourage and reinforce directors to fulfill their fiduciary duties are inevitable. In addition 
to further proceeding the independence from management, the following arrangements are 
recommended. First, the boards should make the better use of other constituencies, such 
as creditors. Second, the boards should be capable of flexible reforms, so that they can 
effectively fulfill the requirements from the company and shareholders. Third, the boards 
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should further improve the evaluation processes of individual directors, so that the 
effective fulfillment of their duties can make the difference; well-performing directors 
should be rewarded sufficiently. 
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